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POWER TO DEFINE THE CONSTITUTIONAL




N an open society, there is continual tension between the desire to
control and punish crimes and abuses, and the desire to protect the
rights of the accused. We want to detect and prevent crime, but feel
that if we allow too much freedom to law enforcement officers, the
innocent may be punished along with the guilty.
Our system of criminal justice has been willing, in some cases, to let
some of the obviously guilty go free, 1 rather than permit them to be
apprehended in a manner violating rights which all persons in our
society possess. Both fairness and effectiveness in law enforcement are
vital to the protection of the citizen. Any decision altering this balance
necessarily results in strong dissent from the protagonists of one or
both sides of the dialogue, frequently leading to proposed legislation
attacking judicial interpretations.
Substantial attention has been given to revision of the federal
criminal laws as a result of recommendations by the National Com-
mission on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws appointed in 1966,2
congressional hearings, 3 bar reports, 4 a controversial Senate subcom-
mittee version of the Federal Criminal Code, 5 and a compromise
version of the Code now before the Senate. 6 Questions of criminal
procedure, whose significance may be as great as that of the substan-
tive laws themselves when dealing with the practicalities of obtaining
convictions, have also come under examination by Congress.
7
*Member of firm of Botein, Hays, Sklar & Herzberg.
1. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
2. Final Report of the National Commission on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws, reprinted
in Reform of the Federal Criminal Laws: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Laws and
Procedures of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 129-514 (1971).
3. E.g., Reform of the Federal Criminal Laws: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Criminal
Laws and Procedures of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. pt. 1I(B)
(1972).
4. See, e.g., Special Comm. on the Proposed New Federal Criminal Law, Ass'n of the Bar of
the City of N.Y., The New Criminal Code Proposed by the National Commission on Reform of
Federal Criminal Laws, reprinted in id. at 3477-572.
5. S. 1, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973). See also S. 1400, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); H.R- 6046,
93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
6. S. 1437, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); accord, H.R. 6869, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
7. See, e.g., Measures Relating to Organized Crime: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Criminal Laws and Procedures of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., Ist Sess.
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What happens when Congress and the Supreme Court disagree on
the proper scope of a particular constitutional right? The Court can,
of course, strike down a congressional enactment as unconstitutional.8
What can Congress do, in turn, to affect the Court's interpretation?
Since the power to interpret constitutional rights rests primarily in
the Court, 9 the power of Congress in this area is necessarily limited.
Congress or its members have attempted to use congressional authority
under article III of the Constitution and under section 5 of the
fourteenth amendment to influence the manner in which constitutional
rights are defined-without much success. 10 In some cases, however,
the Court has invited legislative setting of standards in conformity
with judicially defined constitutional rights." This illustrates that
there is a role which Congress can play in the formulation of criminal
procedure, so as to affect the way in which constitutional rights are
implemented, within certain judicially determined bounds.' 2 This
Article will examine some of the interplay between Congress and the
courts in the area of constitutional rights, and the extent of con-
gressional power to control judicial action with a view to shaping
rights of defendants.
II. USE OF CONGRESSIONAL POWER OVER
FEDERAL COURTS' JURISDICTION
A. Congressional Power over Federal
Courts Under the Constitution
1. Power over Lower Court Jurisdiction
Under article I, section 8, of the Constit'ition, Congress has power "[t]o
constitute Tribunals inferior to the supreme Court."'1 3 Article III, section
1, provides that "[t]he judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested
in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may
from time to time ordain and establish." 14
Congress' power to create inferior courts has been repeatedly said to
include plenary power to regulate the jurisdiction of those courts so as to
219-29 (1969) [hereinafter cited as 1969 Hearings]; President's Comm'n on Law Enforcement and
Administration of Justice, The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society (1967).
8. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
9. See The Federalist No. 78 (A. Hamilton) 429-30 (Colonial Press ed. 1901).
10. See pts. II and III infra.
11. E.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
12. See id. at 467, 490.
13. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 9.
14. Id. art. III, § 1.
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include or exclude certain classes of cases. I5 This does not include, how-
ever, the power to give a lower federal court jurisdiction over a type of
case under compulsion that it decide the case in a manner conflicting with
other constitutional provisions.' 6 Nor does it appear that this power
would permit jurisdiction to be granted with the stipulation that it would
be withdrawn if the exercise of such jurisdiction would lead to the
decision of the case in a way not desired by the drafters of the legisla-
tion. 17 Early assertions that the entire constitutionally permissible juris-
dictional power of the United States must be vested in some federal court
were, nevertheless, repudiated. '8 Furthermore, a number of cases have
sustained limitations on the jurisdiction of federal courts to consider
various defenses to judicial action by stressing that other judicial reme-
dies were available. 19
If a particular statute were to deprive a lower federal court of jurisdic-
tion, reasoning sustaining that jurisdiction on constitutional grounds
despite its withdrawal might run as follows: (1) The court has general
jurisdiction under statutes which are applicable in broad categories of
cases that would normally encompass the one before the court;20 (2) The
exception to the general jurisdiction which has been attempted would,
considered alone, violate the due process clause or otherwise offend the
15. See Lockertyv. Phillips, 319 U.S. 182,187 (1943); Laufv. E.G. Shinner& Co., 303 U.S. 323,
330(1938); Kline v. Burke Constr. Co., 260 U.S. 226, 233-34(1922); Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8 How.)
441, 447-48 (1850). Article HI, section 2, provides: "The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in
Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made,
or which shall be made, under their Authority;-to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public
Ministers and Consuls;--to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction;-to Controversies to
which the United States shall be a Party,-to Controversies between two or more States;-between a
State and Citizens of another State;-between Citizens of different States;-between Citizens of the
same State claiming Lands under Grants of different States, and between a State, or the Citizens
thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects." U.S. Const. art. IM, § 2, cl. 1.
16. See United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 145-48 (1872).
17. Id. (invalidating ch. 251, 16 Stat. 235 (1870)).
18. See Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (I Wheat.) 304 (1816); discussion and authorities
cited in P. Bator, P. Mishkin, D. Shapiro & H. Wechsler, Hart & Wechsler's The Federal Courts and
the Federal System 313-15 (2d ed. 1973). See generally Hart, The Power of Congress To Limit the
Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 Harv. L. Rev. 1362 (1953); see also
Rotunda, Congressional Power To Restrict the Jurisdiction of the Lower Federal Courts and the
Problem of School Busing, 64 Geo. L.J. 839 (1976); Note, Moratorium on School Busing for the
Purpose of Achieving Racial Balance: A New Chapter in Congressional Court-Curbing, 48 Notre
Dame Law. 208 (1972); Note, Busing: A Constitutional Precipice, 7 Suffolk U.L. Rev. 48 (1972);
Note, The Nixon Busing Bills and Congressional Power, 81 Yale L.J. 1542 (1972).
19. See Lichterv. United States, 334 U.S. 742, 791(1948); Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414,
433 (1944); Lockerty v. Phillips, 319 U.S. 182, 186-87 (1943).
20. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. §§ 702-706 (1970), as amended by Act of Oct. 21, 1976, Pub. L No.
94-574, § 1, 90 Stat. 2721; 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1361, 1651 (1970), as amended by Act of Oct. 21,
1976, Pub. L. No. 94-574, § 2, 90 Stat. 2721.
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Constitution; (3) Since the general jurisdiction remains and the objection
to it is not sustainable, the court retains jurisdiction and can proceed to
the merits.
2. Power over Supreme Court Jurisdiction
In the case of the Supreme Court, the context is changed, and the
argument against withdrawal of jurisdiction is strengthened because that
Court has been created by the Constitution.21 Here, the argument that
Congress can choose to create or not to create the tribunal, and therefore
is not required to provide any jurisdiction, is clearly inapplicable. How-
ever, article III, section 2, provides that in most cases subject to federal
jurisdiction "the supreme Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction, both as
to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as
the Congress shall make."'22 Much discussion has centered on the mean-
ing of the terms "Exceptions" and "Regulations." Scholars have ques-
tioned whether in theory these terms permit Congress to eliminate all
jurisdiction from the Supreme Court-hence, in practice, to remove
entire areas from its jurisdiction-or whether they permit Congress to
withdraw jurisdiction if a case were to be decided in a particular way. 23
Such possibilities may be affected, however, by the due process clause of
the fifth amendment.
3. Limitations Imposed by the Fifth
Amendment Due Process Clause
Possible changes which Congress could make in the jurisdiction of
the Supreme Court (as well as other federal courts), consistent with
article II, are limited in their scope by the fifth amendment due
process clause. 24 This clause was enacted subsequent to the original
Constitution and is a limitation on the powers granted to Congress in
the original Constitution. 25 Any "Exception" or "Regulation" under
21. U.S. Const. art. III, § 1.
22. Id. § 2, cl. 2. The power of Congress to include or exclude certain classes of cases has been
held to apply to the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction. "Not only may whole classes of cases be
kept out of the jurisdiction altogether, but particular classes of questions may be subjected to
re-examination and review, while others are not." The Francis Wright, 105 U.S. 381, 386 (1882).
23. See Ratner, Congressional Power over the Appellate Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, 109
U. Pa. L. Rev. 157 (1960); Note, Limitations on the Appellate Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court,
20 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 99 (1958).
24. General Motors Corp. v. Battaglia, 169 F.2d 254, 257 (2d Cir. 1948); Hart, The Power of
Congress To Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 Harv. L. Rev.
1362, 1372 (1953).
25. On the priority of later provisions in cases of conflict, see McLean Trucking Co. v. United
States, 321 U.S. 67, 79 (1944). Cf. Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381, 393,
395-96 (1940) (right of Congress to create exceptions to previously enacted statutes).
(Vol. 46
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article III limiting petitions to the Supreme Court which would violate
due process would, therefore, be unconstitutional.
Of course, appeals are not necessarily required by due process in all
cases. However, at least where the first amendment rights of freedom
of speech and press are involved, the Court has held procedural
safeguards and judicial review mandatory under the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment. 26 In addition, affirmative exceptions to
otherwise generally available appellate process which have the effect of
carving out entire areas of jurisdiction without justification might be
attacked on due process grounds as unreasonable, being detrimental to
constitutionally protected rights. Even if in certain areas due process
does not prohibit withdrawals of existing general Supreme Court
appellate jurisdiction, it may violate due process to take away effective
judicial protection of individuals who allege violations of due process,
at least if alternative protection is inadequate. If such an argument
were accepted, withdrawal of Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction
over matters involving fifth or fourteenth amendment due process
would in turn violate due process, and could not be sustained.
Given the historical importance of the life tenure requisite at the
summit of the United States judicial system, 27 it is arguable that for a
judicial remedy to be adequate, it must include ultimate review by a body
composed of judges having life tenure. Obviously, not all judges passing
on federal constitutional questions must have life tenure. However,
where violations of due process are alleged, an ultimate appeal to a
tribunal having the stability guaranteed by life tenure may be found
implicit in American due process as it has developed through history. To
consider such a question we would, according to Justice Stone, "turn to
the words of the Constitution read in their historical setting as revealing
the purpose of its framers, and search for admissible meanings of its
words which, in the circumstances of their application, will effectuate
those purposes." 28
Thus, at the very least, it appears quite likely that judicial review by
26. See National Socialist Party v. Village of Skokie, 97 S. CL 2205 (1977) (freedom of
speech); Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976) (freedom of the press); cf. Freedman
v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965) (freedom of expression-films for public showing).
27. U.S. Const. art. I; cf. The Federalist No. 78 (A. Hamilton) 431-34 (Colonial Press ed.
1901) (discussing the interrelationship between life tenure and independence of federal judges);
Kurland, The Constitution and the Tenure of Federal Judges: Some Notes from History, 36 U.
Chi. L. Rev. 665 (1969) (suggesting that legislation providing alternate means of removal will not
solve problems of judicial tenure). In upholding lesser tenure for District of Columbia judges
handling local cases in Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389 (1973), however, the Court said-
"[T]he requirements of Art. I... are applicable where laws of national applicability and affairs
of national concern are at stake. . Id. at 407-08. See also authorities cited in id. at 410-22
(Douglas, J., dissenting).
28. United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 317-18 (1941).
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judges protected by life tenure in cases involving alleged violations of due
process may be deemed implicit in due process, and hence constitution-
ally protected.
B. Efforts of or Within Congress To Withdraw
Jurisdiction from Federal Courts
1. Judicial Treatment of These Efforts:
Ex Parte McCardle and Subsequent Cases
The foremost authority cited to support the concept of unlimited
congressional power to withdraw Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction is
Ex parte McCardle.29 McCardle, though not in military service at the
time, was held in military custody while awaiting trial before a military
commission. He had been charged with making libelous and incendiary
statements in a newspaper of which he was editor. 30 McCardle alleged
that he was unlawfully restrained by the military forces, and sought a
writ of habeas corpus. 31 When his petition was denied, he appealed to the
Supreme Court under an act passed in 1867 granting that Court jurisdic-
tion over certain habeas corpus appeals. 32 After argument but before
decision, however, Congress repealed the 1867 act, 33 and argument was
subsequently held on the effect of the repeal. 34
The Supreme Court upheld the repealing statute and declined to
exercise jurisdiction. 35 It did, however, construe the repeal as leaving
prior jurisdiction unaffected and thus avoided the question of whether a
remedy could have been entirely cut off:
Counsel seem to have supposed, if effect be given to the repealing act in question, that
the whole appellate power of the court, in cases of habeas corpus, is denied. But this is an
error. The act of 1868 does not except from that jurisdiction any cases but appeals from
Circuit Courts under the act of 1867. It does not affect the jurisdiction which was
previously exercised. 36
29. 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1869).
30. Id. at 508.
31. Id. at 507.
32. Ch. 28, 14 Stat. 385 (1867). The Act stated that federal courts and judges, "in addition to
the authority already conferred by law, shall have power to grant writs of habeas corpus in all
cases where any person may be restrained of his or her liberty in violation of the constitution, or
of any treaty or law of the United States; and it shall be lawful for such person so restrained of his
or her liberty to apply to either of said justices or judges for a writ of habeas corpus . . . ." Id.
33. Ch. 34, § 2, 15 Stat. 44 (1868). This repeal occurred in a period of extreme stress having
few parallels in our nation's history. The impeachment of Andrew Johnson reflects the turmoil of
the times. See J. Kennedy, Profiles in .Courage 121-5t (1956).
34. 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) at 509-12.
35. Id. at 515.
36. Id. The fact that this position was taken is a clear indication that the Court did not wish
to concede that all jurisdiction was being denied. Whether the opinion was logical is another
[Vol. 46
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Thus, the decision in McCardle strongly emphasized that other means
besides review under the statute repealed were available to remedy the
allegedly illegal detention. 37
Nevertheless, the generally accepted view is that Ex parte McCardle
declared that the exceptions clause gives Congress plenary power like
the commerce clause. 38  One commentator discussing McCardle ex-
pressed this concept as follows:
The power to make exceptions to Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction is a plenary
power. It is given in express terms and without limitation, regardless of the more
modest uses that might have been anticipated and, hopefully, generally to be respected
by Congress as a matter of enlightened policy once the power was granted, as it was,
to the fullest extent. In short, the clause is complete exactly as it stands: the appellate
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is subject to "such Exceptions and under such
Regulations as the Congress shall make." 39
In Ex parte Yerger,40 decided in the same year as McCardle, the
Supreme Court upheld its jurisdiction over a habea corpus proceeding
brought before it by writ of certiorari, rather than appeal, under
jurisdictional legislation prior to 1867. Thus Ex parte Yerger makes it
clear that the McCardle Court merely allowed Congress to withdraw a
matter. One commentator has criticized McCardle for the "unguarded suggestion by the Court
that the case was dismissed for 'want of jurisdiction' when, according to the Court's own
observations, it had adequate jurisdiction to proceed but simply declined, under the circumstan-
ces, to proceed sua sponte on a different jurisdictional basis than that previously relied upon by a
party in no immediate danger of irreparable harm." Van Alstyne, A Critical Guide to Ex Parte
McCardle, 15 Ariz. L. Rev. 229, 254 (1973). Van Alstyne also pointed out that "the Court treated
the Repealer Act as though the Act (which was the only statute immediately in controversy before
the Court) itself established some 'exception' to the Court's article M appellate jurisdiction when
in fact the Repealer Act evidently created no exception to that jurisdiction and may not have been
based on that clause at all." Id.
37. 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) at 515.
38. See, e.g., Burton, Two Significant Decisions: Ex Parte Milligan and Ex Parte McCardle,
41 A.B.A.J. 121, 176 (1955); Wechsler, The Courts and the Constitution, 65 Colum. L. Rev.
1001, 1005 (1965).
39. Van Alstyne, A Critical Guide to Ex Parte McCardle, 15 Ariz. L. Rev. 229, 260 (1973).
Eleven years after the decision in McCardle, the Supreme Court affirmed the constitutionality of
congressional limitation of Supreme Court jurisdiction in admiralty appeals to questions of law
arising on the record. The Francis Wright, 105 U.S. 381 (1882). In discussing the exceptions
and regulations clause, U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 2, the Court stated. "What [the appellate]
powers [of the Court] shall be, and to what extent they shall be exercised, are, and always have
been, proper subjects of legislative control.... The whole of a civil law appeal may be given, or
a part. The constitutional requirements are all satisfied if one opportunity is had for the trial of all
parts of a case. Everything beyond that is matter of legislative discretion, not of constitutional
right. The Constitution prohibits a retrial of the facts in suits at common law where one trial has
been had by a jury... ; but in suits in equity or in admiralty Congress is left free to make such
exceptions and regulations in respect to retrials as on the whole may seem best." Id. at 386.
40. 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 85 (1869).
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procedure whereby the Court could hear certain cases, rather than its
power to hear those cases. The Court implied that withdrawals of
jurisdiction such as the one at issue in McCardle would not necessarily
be upheld in all cases. The Court stated that the congressional action
in McCardle was taken under "peculiar" circumstances. 4 1 The action
was branded as "unusual and hardly to be justified except upon some
imperious public exigency." '42
In 1870, Congress withdrew the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims
over cases which involved recovery of captured property, where the
claimant had received a pardon containing a recital of previous
adherence to the Confederacy. 43 The following year, the Supreme
Court in United States v. Klein44 found that this withdrawal of
jurisdiction was an attempt to prescribe a rule of decision in conflict
with the pardon power. 45 However, this still left open the question of
whether jurisdiction could be exercised when Congress had denied the
power of the Courr to act in the type of case before it. The Court
resorted to the somewhat surprising statement that it was "impossible
to believe that this provision was not inserted in the appropriation bill
through inadvertence. "46
A similar decision was made, but more modern language used,
about a century later when the Supreme Court declined to apply a
limitation on jurisdiction over conduct of Selective Service Boards
alleged to be in direct contravention of statute. 47 The Court said that
the jurisdictional limitation48 could not "sustain a literal reading.) 49
In other cases, where it was not so clear that Congress had with-
drawn jurisdiction in order to cut off a judicial remedy when constitu-
tional rights were violated, the Supreme Court has held that a judicial
remedy was available.50 As a general rule, the Court will construe
ambiguous statutory language so as to provide a remedy, especially
where doing so will avoid what the Court believes to be a serious
41. Id. at 103.
42. Id. at 104.
43. Ch. 251, 16 Stat. 235 (1870).
44. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1871).
45. Id. at 145-48.
46. Id. at 148.
47. Oestereich v. Selective Serv. Bd., 393 U.S. 233 (1968).
48. Military Selective Service Act of 1967, 50 U.S.C. app. § 460(b)(3) (Supp. V 1975).
49. 393 U.S. at 238.
50. See, e.g., Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 48-51 (1950); American Power &
Light Co. v. SEC, 329 U.S. 90, 107-08 (1946); Dismuke v. United States, 297 U.S. 167, 171-72
(1936); cf. Hannegan v. Esquire, Inc., 327 U.S. 146, 155-57 (1946) (power granted by Congress to
Postmaster General to inspect mail for rate classification held impliedly limited by the Constitu-
tion).
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constitutional question. 5' As Chief Justice Marshall once said: "Almost
all compositions contain words, which, taken in their rigorous sense,
would convey a meaning different from that which is obviously
intended." 52
In a 1958 case involving the alleged disregard by the National Labor
Relations Board of a prohibition against combining certain types of
employees in collective bargaining units,5 3 the Court said that review
must "[s]urely" be available if a clear violation of law can be shown.S4
The Court stated: "If the absence of jurisdiction of the federal courts
meant a sacrifice or obliteration of a right which Congress had created,
the inference would be strong that Congress intended the statutory
provisions governing the general jurisdiction of those courts to con-
trol."55
The same result has been achieved in some instances by simply
ignoring a jurisdictional issue or treating the case as a deceptively
simple one under general jurisdictional provisions.5 6 This is done on
the unspoken premise that jurisdictional limitations obviously do not
apply to a case involving a plain violation of legal rights where no
other remedy is available.5 7 Hallowed language can be cited in support
of a finding of jurisdiction in these cases, such as the following from
Marbury v. Madison: "The very essence of civil liberty certainly
consists in the right of every individual to claim the protection of the
laws, whenever he receives an injury."58 Thus, the Court may disre-
gard a statutory limitation on jurisdiction without reaching a constitu-
tional finding that the withdrawal of jurisdiction is actually invalid.5 9
51. See, e.g., Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 507-08 (1959); Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116,
129-30 (1958). See generally A. Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch 169-83 (1962).
52. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 414 (1819).
53. Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U.S. 184 (1958).
54. Id. at 189.
55. Id. at 190 (quoting Switchmen's Union v. National Mediation Bd., 320 U.S. 297, 300
(1943)). See also Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 224-28 (1953) (Jackson,
J., dissenting).
56. See, e.g., Harmon v. Brucker, 355 U.S. 579, 581-82 (1958) (per curiam).
57. One methodology of judicial review allows review under broadly phrased constitutional
provisions, primarily where othei restraints are inadequate or threatened. See generally Givens,
Chief Justice Stone and the Developing Functions of Judicial Review, 47 Va. L. Rev. 1321
(1961).
58. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803). This language was quoted in Bivens v. Six Unknown
Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 397 (1971).
59. See Oestereich v. Selective Serv. Bd., 393 U.S. 233 (1968); Abbott Laboratories v.
Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967); Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U.S. 184 (1958); ef. Myers v. Bethlehem
Shipbldg. Corp., 303 U.S. 41, 47-53 (1938) (proper interpretation of jurisdictional questions
should have resulted in a dismissal by the district court since Congress had provided an adequate
procedure for obtaining remedies); Skinner & Eddy Corp. v. United States, 249 U.S. 557, 562-63
1977]
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Withdrawals of jurisdiction which have been sustained have in-
volved the lower federal courts and have never involved withdrawal of
all federal judicial remedies for an alleged violation of federal con-
stitutional rights. There has always been another remedy at least
arguably available, or a question as to whether a federal constitutional
right was in fact involved, or both. 60 Language in many of these and
other cases has clearly implied that the availability of federal judicial
review over federal constitutional questions is basic to our constitu-
tional system, and that its withdrawal would either be unconstitutional
or raise the most serious constitutional questions. 61 Where, however,
the intent is plain and no constitutionally protected rights of the parties
are at stake, e.g., because other remedies are available, or because the
nature of the decision being made does not touch constitutionally
protected interests of the parties, it has been held that judicial review
can be denied by statute. 62
(1919) (where there is a contention that the Interstate Commerce Commission has exceeded
its statutory powers, the courts have jurisdiction to enjoin a commission order despite a party's
failure to seek administrative redress); Jewel Cos. v. FTC, 432 F.2d 1155, 1159 (7th Cir.
1970) (district court denied jurisdiction where there could still be judicial review following
proceedings of the FTC); Elmo Div. of Drive-X Co. v. Dixon, 348 F.2d 342, 34344 (D.C. Cir.
1965) (per curiam) (statutory provision for review of agency action by courts of appeals does not
necessarily preclude district court jurisdiction); Deering Milliken, Inc. v. Johnston, 295 F.2d 856,
861-62 (4th Cir. 1961) (federal court jurisdiction to compel administrative action is authorized to
the extent necessary to satisfy a statutory requirement); Knoll Assocs., Inc. v. Dixon, 232 F.
Supp. 283, 285-86 (S.D.N.Y. 1964) (federal court jurisdiction exists in administrative agency
cases to protect constitutional rights or prevent substantial unfairness); Wanderer v. Kaplan,
[1962] Trade Cas. (CCH) V 70,535 (D.D.C. 1962) (district court had jurisdiction where plaintiff
contended that the FTC had violated his constitutional right to counsel); Archer v. Lemke, [1962]
Trade Cas. (CCH) $ 70,417 (N.D. Ill. 1962) (district court jurisdiction proper to protect witnesses
contending denial by FTC of right to counsel); Summers, The Law of Union Discipline: What the
Courts Do in Fact, 70 Yale L.J. 175 (1960) (New York courts look beyond the text of applicable
union constitutions to considerations of fairness and public policy).
60. See Lichter v. United States, 334 U.S. 742, 791-92 (1948); Yakus v. United States, 321
U.S. 414, 433-34 (1944); Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. Huffman, 319 U.S. 293 (1943);
Lockerty v. Phillips, 319 U.S. 182, 186 (1943); Lauf v. E.G. Shinner & Co., 303 U.S. 323, 330
(1938); Hart, The Power of Congress To Limit the Jurisdition of Federal Courts: An Exercise in
Dialectic, 66 Harv. L. Rev. 1362 (1953); Note, The Nixon Busing Bills and Congressional Power,
81 Yale L.J. 1542, 1546-58 (1972).
61. See Hart, The Power of Congress To Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An
Exercise in Dialectic, 66 Harv. L. Rev. 1362, 1372-74 (1953); notes 79-83 infra and accompany-
ing text; cf. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958) (federal courts are "supreme in the exposition
of the law of the Constitution').
62. See Briscoe v. Bell, 97 S. Ct. 2428, 2433-34 (1977); Morris v. Gressette, 97 S. Ct. 2411,
2418-19 & n.15 (1977); Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159, 165-67 (1970); Gaston County v. United
States, 395 U.S. 285, 292 n.6 (1969); South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 316-17 (1966).
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2. Bills Attempting To Withdraw
Federal Judicial Jurisdiction
Even though long established case law, as described above, makes it
fairly plain that Congress cannot cut back on federal judicial jurisdic-
tion, and in particular Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction, in order
to restrict constitutional rights as defined by the Court, bills are still
introduced to do just that. Some of these bills have dealt with criminal
matters; others with civil matters.
In 1957, Senator Jenner introduced a bill which was designed to
deprive the Court of appellate jurisdiction over all cases involving the
validity of: (1) contempt proceedings against witnesses before con-
gressional committees; (2) dismissal of government employees on secu-
rity grounds; (3) state laws for the control of subversive activities; (4)
regulations relating to subversive activities of public school teachers;
and (5) state requirements for admission to the practice of law.63 This
measure reflected its supporters' dissatisfaction with Supreme Court
decisions in these areas. 64 Under this bill, the meaning of the Con-
stitution in the specified areas would be finally determined by each of
the eleven courts of appeals and by the highest court of each state.
6S
The bill was never passed and public hostility to the unpopular
decisions receded. However, one must note that this was not an
attempt by Congress to usurp the Court's power for itself. Under the
bill, Congress' power over the enumerated subjects would not have
been enhanced; but the courts of appeals and the highest courts in the
states would have been given final authority over these subjects.
In 1964, the Supreme Court handed down six decisions dealing with
the reapportionment of the legislatures of six states.66 There was an
immediate outcry against these decisions by those who favored a
63. S. 2646, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957). A bill was also introduced in the second session of
Congress aimed at depriving the Supreme Court and the federal courts of appeals of appellate
jurisdiction in any case where the action of a state concerning its public schools was attacked on
grounds other than "substantial inequality of physical facilities and other tangible factors." S.
3467, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1958).
64. See, e.g., Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178 (1957); Schware v. Board of Bar
Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 (1957); Cole v. Young, 351 U.S. 536 (1956); Slochower v. Board of
Higher Educ., 350 U.S. 551 (1956); Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497 (1956).
65. See generally W. Murphy, Congress and the Court 154-62 (1962); Comment, Title 11 of
the Omnibus Crime Bill: A Study of the Interaction of Law and Politics, 48 Neb. L. Rev. 193
(1968).
66. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) (Alabama); Lucas v. Forty-fourth Gen. Assembly,
377 U.S. 713 (1964) (Colorado); Roman v. Sincock, 377 U.S. 695 (1964) (Delaware); Maryland
Comm. for Fair Representation v. Tawes, 377 U.S. 656 (1964) (Maryland); WMCA, Inc. v.
Lomenzo, 377 U.S. 633 (1964) (New York); Davis v. Mann, 377 U.S. 678 (1964) (Virginia).
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determination by a state of its own voting districts. 67 In an effort to
override the Court's holdings, several resolutions were introduced in
Congress to provide for a constitutional amendment which would
prevent further federal judicial action with respect to apportionment. 68
In addition, bills such as one introduced by Representative Tuck in the
89th Congress 69 would have eliminated district court original jurisdic-
tion and the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction to hear state
reapportionment cases.70 None of these efforts was successful; hence,
the bills introduced never faced a court test. Nevertheless, these bills
represent reliance on McCardle to enable Congress to restrict the
appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.71
Four years later, another attempt was made to remove federal
judicial jurisdiction in order to weaken court-defined constitutional
rights, through early versions of Title II of the Omnibus Crime Control
and Safe Streets Act of 1968.72 As reported by the Senate Judiciary
Committee, Title II attempted to overrule certain Court decisions and
remove jurisdiction. This version of Title II contained four sections.
The first was aimed at displacing the Miranda warnings and replacing
them with a voluntariness rule based upon the trial court's examina-
tion of the circumstances. The second would have removed the Court's
jurisdiction to review state court cases in which it had been determined
that a confession had been voluntarily made. The third section, though
badly drafted, would have overruled United States v. Wade, 73 which
required that attorneys be present at lineups as a condition to the
introduction of an eyewitness' line-up identification at trial. This
section also removed federal jurisdiction over state cases admitting
eyewitness identification. The final section sharply reduced the avail-
ability of habeas corpus for review of state criminal convictions.74
The Senate rejected the second and fourth sections of Title II and
that part of the third section which would have denied federal jurisdic-
tion over state cases dealing with eyewitness identification.7 5 Thus,
Title II as enacted diminished the impact of Miranda and Wade, but
was not the overhaul of criminal procedure planned.7 6 It was modified
67. See, e.g., Kennedy, The Reapportionment Decisions: A Constitutional Amendment is
Needed, 51 A.B.A.J. 123 (1965).
68. See, e.g., H.R.J. Res. 14, 24 & 50, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965).
69. H.R. 1584, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965).
70. E.g., S. 534, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965); H.R. 11925, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964).
71. See 20 Record of N.Y.C.B.A. 240-42 (1965).
72. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3501-3502 (1970).
73. 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
74. S. 917, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. §§ 701-702 (1968). This version of Title II also appears at S.
Rep. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 9-10 (1968).
75. See 114 Cong. Rec. 14175, 14177, 14180-84 (1968).
76. The bill came under attack from bar groups and others. See, e.g., Comms. on Civil
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to apply the revisions of the Miratda and the Wade rules only to
actions in federal court, and did not withdraw any of the jurisdiction
of the Supreme Court or other federal courts.
77
C. The Institution of Judicial Review
Since, despite case law to the contrary,78 there are recurrent efforts
to deprive federal courts of judicial review on constitutional issues,
discussion of the role of judicial review remains important. Future
periods of tension between Congress and the courts may produce
renewed congressional endeavors to nullify the courts' position on
constitutional matters by taking jurisdiction from them.
There is support for the institution of judicial review, formally
enunciated in Marbury v. Madison,"9 in the words of the Bill of
Rights. The first amendment begins with the words "Congress shall
make no law . . ,"o The import of this phrase appears to be that
the framers of the Bill of Rights did not intend the courts to enforce
laws of the kind forbidden by the amendment. In a similar vein,
Hamilton, writing for The Federalist, stated:
There is no position which depends on clearer principles than that every act of a
delegated authority, contrary to the tenor of the commission under which it is
exercised, is void. No legislative act, therefore, contrary to the Constitution can be
valid. To deny this would be to affirm that the deputy is greater than his principal;
that the servant is above his master; that the representatives of the people are superior
to the people themselves; that men acting by virtue of powers may do not only what
their powers do not authorize, but what they forbid. 8'
In accordance with this concept, Hamilton stated that the courts
should be the ultimate arbiters of the constitutionality of laws, and
that laws which they found unconstitutional should be struck down:
The interpretation of the laws is the proper and peculiar province of the courts. A
constitution is, in fact, and must be regarded by the judges, as a fundamental law. It,
therefore, belongs to them to ascertain its meaning, as well as the meaning of any
particular act proceeding from the legislative body. If there should happen to be an
irreconcilable variance between the two, that which has the superior obligation and
validity ought, of course, to be preferred; or, in other words, the constitution ought to
be preferred to the statute, the intention of the people to the intention of their agents.5 Z
Rights and Federal Legislation, Ass'n of the Bar of the City of N.Y., Proposed Legislation
Relating to Federal Jurisdiction in Confession Cases, reprinted in 114 Cong. Rec. 14163 (1968).
77. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3501-3502 (1970).
78. See pt. U(B)(1) supra.
79. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
80. U.S. Const. amend. I.
81. The Federalist No. 78 (A. Hamilton) 429-30 (Colonial Press ed. 1901).
82. Id. at 430. An interesting commentary on the significance of the question of judicial
review to the politicians who were debating the issue has been made in I C. Warren, The
Supreme Court in United States History (1922): "It has been very generally assumed by historians
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In light of our country's English background and history from
colonial times through the early constitutional period, Professor John
M. Kernochan has concluded: "[T]he institution of judicial review
established for the American nation by the opinion of Chief Justice
Marshall in Marbury v. Madison in 1803 was . . . the natural fruition
of centuries of development. '8 3 Historical evidence consistent with the
text of tie Constitution thus accords with the unbroken tradition of the
exercise of judicial review since 1803. Historical and textual support,
however, can hardly settle the issue of its desirability in contemporary
society.
When the Court makes an unpopular decision, critics frequently
point out the nonelective character of the Court's membership. Con-
troversies concerning the Court have tended to revolve around asser-
tions that the Court substitutes its own views as to what is desirable
for those of the elected representatives of the people. Underlying many
of the criticisms is the view that judicial review of the constitutionality
of the acts of the elected branches is a usurpation of power by the
judiciary; such judicial review is claimed to be contrary to strict
democratic principles.
The argument against judicial review has been made as follows:
Democracy means government by the people, and under our system
the people rule through representatives who can be voted out of office
if the people disapprove of their policies. Judicial review of the acts of
the elected branches contravenes majority rule and means that the
judiciary is supreme on all questions which it chooses to decide. Since
judges are appointed for life and hence are not responsible to the
electorate, democratic theory is said to be violated. 84
and jurists, writing mostly ex cathedra, that the opposition to Federal judicial supremacy which
was voiced in these debates [over the Alien and Sedition Acts], chiefly by representatives of
Virginia and Kentucky, was based on political and legal views regarding the Constitution. A
review of a mass of historical material contained in an extensive correspondence between Senator
Breckenridge and his Kentucky constituents shows that this assumption is probably erroneous,
and that the opposition arose, not from any adherence to abstract political or juridical theories,
but largely from the very concrete fear lest the decisions of the Federal Courts might be adverse
to the land laws and the landholders of Virginia and Kentucky." Id. at 218-19 (citations omitted).
83. Kernochan, On the Origin of Judicial Review, in Cases on Constitutional Law, 69 (6th ed.
N. Dowling 1959). Professor Kernochan's conclusion is based upon the English background for
judicial review from the Norman Conquest through the Magna Carta (1215), the Petition of Right
of 1628, the English Bill of Rights of 1689, the practices of the colonial period, the events of the
period from the Revolution to the Constitution, the debates of the Convention and on ratification,
and the writings of the early constitutional period prior to 1803. Id. at 20-84. See generally E.
Rostow, The Sovereign Prerogative (1962), reviewed by Phillips, 18 Record of N.Y.C.B.A.
152 (1963); see also P. Bator, P. Mishkin, D. Shapiro & H. Wechsler, Hart & Wechsler's The
Federal Courts and the Federal System 4-6 (2d ed. 1973); A. Bickel, The Least Dangerous
Branch 14-16 (1962); The Federalist No. 78 (A. Hamilton).
84. S. Hook, Democracy and Judicial Review, in The Paradoxes of Freedom 63 (1962).
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The ancient theory of democracy was that the people should rule
directly, deciding questions of public policy by popular vote. The
Declaration of Independence adopted a different position, however. It
affirmed instead that governments derive their "just powers from the
consent of the governed."8 5 Consent seemed to mean that those who
exercise authority must be chosen by the people in elections with free
debate, or appointed by those who are so elected. Such is the nature of
all the positions which have been established under the Constitution of
the United States-they are either elective or filled by appointment by
elected officials.
Once it is established that a position is to be filled in this manner,
the question remains as to how long those selected should serve. A
short term allows the electorate to alter the policies of government
more rapidly. But if a term is too short, little may be accomplished
because turnover will be great and continuity unduly disturbed. 86 If
government is to be either fair or effective, the people cannot afford
the luxury of changing their minds too often. In considering this
problem, the framers of the Constitution fixed the term of members of
the House of Representatives at two years,87 that of the President at
four years, 88 that of the Senators at six years,89 and that of federal
judges, including Justices of the Supreme Court, at life or until
voluntary retirement, except in cases of misconduct.90
In the first 180 years of the Court's history, 100 justices were
appointed,9 ' which averages just over one appointment every two
years. At this rate, five Justices, a majority of the Court, are replaced
every decade. While the average service of a Justice is longer than the
six-year term of a Senator, the composition of the Court is thus fairly
responsive to the will of the elected branches over the long run. Where
a serious issue has set the Court and the elected branches at odds,
changing a small number of Justices may frequently prove decisive.
The charge that the Court is undemocratic thus resolves itself into a
question of degree: Is the term of service of the Justices too long,
considering the duties of the Court? If the Court is to serve as an
umpire preserving open access to the political apd judicial processes
85. The Declaration of Independence (1776).
86. Concerning the need for substantial tenure in some kinds of federal offices, see The
Federalist No. 71 (A. Hamilton). Cf. L. Johnson, Third Annual Message, Jan. 12, 1966, reprinted
in 3 State of the Union Messages of the Presidents 3176 (1966) (suggesting extension of term of
Congressmen to four years).
87. U.S. Const. art. I, § 2, cl. 1.
88. Id. art. I1, § 1, cl. 1.
89. Id. art. I, § 3, ci. 1.
90. Id. art. III, § 1.




within fair procedures, and if the Court's role is to stand fast before the
vicissitudes of the prevailing national consensus, 92 which the Legisla-
ture should reflect, the term does not seem too long.
Even if the power of the Supreme Court considered alone might be
deemed undemocratic, it would still not follow that the consequence of
the role of the Court is to remove our governmental structure further
from "government of the people, by the people, and for the people." 93
Political decisions in the United States have never been made in
accordance with pure democratic theory alone, nor could they be,
given the size of the nation and the problems which it must confront.
Many issues are sufficiently technical that the public cannot deal with
them directly in an informed manner. 94 This does not diminish the role
of the people; it merely makes it different from that which is sometimes
supposed. The public can make basic underlying choices through
elections and public debate. In fact, the very existence of the right to
vote frequently makes the adoption of policies which would alienate
important segments of voters less likely.
Some of our many departures from the theory of pure democracy
have important virtues, and there is a lack of workable alternatives to
others. 95 Taken in the aggregate they represent a substantial departure
from pure democratic theory. Accordingly, the question which should
be asked concerning the role of the Supreme Court is not simplistically,
"Is the Court compatible with democratic theory?" but rather, "What
is the Court's impact on our constitutional system?" This matter
should be examined from the aspects of both structure and long-term
operation.
One consequence of -the Court's role is to give our democratic
government greater continuity-because of the very feature of life
tenure sometimes attacked as undemocratic. The long-run impact of
the Court is inherently conservative in the sense of conservation of
enduring values. As Professor Charles L. Black, Jr., has put it,
judicial review is "the people's institutionalized means of self-
92. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 268-69 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring) (quoting
Board of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943)); A. Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch
239 (1962).
93. A. Lincoln, Gettysburg Address, reprinted in H. Raymond, History of the Administration
of President Lincoln 382 (1864).
94. W. Lippmann, Public Opinion 300-03 (1946); see, e g., Senate Panel Backs New Energy
Tax Bill, N.Y. Times, Oct. 15, 1977, at 1, col. 3.
95. For instance, our system of representation in Congress enables Congressmen to gain more
specialized knowledge on the issues confronting them. Likewise, the President's authority over
foreign policy, see United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936), provides
the only practical way that a large nation such as ours can keep diplomatic secrets and maintain
coherent relations with other nations.
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control. ''96 Future Chief Justice Harlan F. Stone expressed a similar
sentiment in 1915:
By vesting this power ultimately in the Supreme Court, a body removed from po-
litical activity and possessing no control over the armed forces or material resources
of the nation, and by the method of its constitution removed from the immediate
pressure of popular clamor, the Constitution insured the peace and order of the
country and intrusted the civil liberty of its citizens to the body best adapted to
preserve and perpetuate it.97
A second impact is to give greater weight to enduring national
interests and greater recognition to needs affecting the nation as a
whole. 98 The Justices do not represent any particular state or
district-they act on behalf of the entire nation in interpreting its
Constitution and laws. The President is the only other officer who can
ever individually occupy this role: all others, including administrative
appointees, have a constituency of specific interest groups with which
they must deal more regularly than with others. 99
Do these considerations guarantee that the exercise of judicial re-
view will be constructive? Obviously not. What, then, is our protec-
tion against possible abuse through judicial review? It should not be
fear on the part of the Justices of reprisal against themselves or against
the Court if the decisions they issue are contrary to contemporary
public opinion. Indeed, it is when our public servants-on or off the
bench-resist such pressures that they are later applauded for their
courage. 100 A valid protection is a constructive response on the part of
the public and the elected branches to the Court's decisions. This
involves the search for a new synthesis in those cases where judicial
decisions do not meet all the needs in a situation. 1'0 It entails neither
hostility to the role of the Tribunal nor automatic acceptance of the
most recent decision on a particular point as the last word.
There is also a practical objection to attempted withdrawals of
Supreme Court jurisdiction to review federal constitutional questions;
namely, the confusion and lack of uniformity in interpretations of
federal law that would result. It was not by accident that Chief Justice
96. C. Black, The People and the Court 107 (1960).
97. H. Stone, Law and Its Administration 138 (1915); see id. at 130-S8.
98. Cf. Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm'n, 97 S. Ct. 2434 (1977) (Court
rejected a state's contention that the standardization required by its statute served the national
interest and was therefore a justifiable burden on interstate commerce).
99. See generally R. Neustadt, Presidential Power (1976); C. Rossiter, The American Presi-
dency (1956); Jaffe, The Effective Limits of the Administrative Process: .4 Reevaluation, 67 Harv.
L. Rev. 1105, 1107-13 (1954).
100. See generally J. Kennedy, Profiles in Courage (1956).
101. See pt. IV infra.
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Marshall said, in regard to major constitutional questions, "[Buy this
tribunal alone can the decision be made.' 10 2
For all these reasons, it seems most unlikely that changes in the
administration of criminal justice could workably be achieved by use
of congressional power over federal judicial jurisdiction.
The McCardle decision has not resulted in successful use of the
unlimited congressional power the decision appears to permit. The
case should be viewed as an unfortunate departure from traditional
judicial protection of due process. Were Congress now to try to use
McCardle to eliminate federal appellate jurisdiction over selected
criminal matters, there is little likelihood that courts would uphold
such legislation, if the legislation were interpreted to withdraw juris-
diction over alleged violations of due process.
III. CONGRESSIONAL POWER To CHARACTERIZE
EQUAL PROTECTION AND DUE PROCESS UNDER
THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
A. Background
Apart from article III power over the jurisdiction of the federal
courts, broad congressional power over criminal procedure in state as
well as federal cases has been said to flow from section 5 of the
fourteenth amendment, which empowers Congress to enforce the
provisions of that amendment by appropriate legislation.10 3 Section 5
of the fourteenth amendment provides: "The Congress shall have
power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this
article. °10 4 This includes the due process and equal protection clauses
of section 1 of the fourteenth amendment.
Until recently, this enforcement provision has had little impact on
constitutional law. The early decisions concerning the section were
pointed to Congress' new relationship with the states and had been
102. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 401 (1819); see Glidden Co. v.
Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 567-68 (1962); The Francis Wright, 105 U.S. 381, 386 (1882); Comm. on
Federal Legislation, Ass'n of the Bar of the City of N.Y., Proposed Constitutional Amendments
and Jurisdictional Limitations on Federal Courts with Respect to Apportionment of State
Legislatures, 4 Reps. of Comms. of the Ass'n of the Bar Concerned with Fed. Legislation No. 1,
at 1, 12-15 (1965); Executive Comm., Ass'n of the Bar of the City of N.Y., Three Amendments to
United States Constitution Proposed by the Council of State Governments, 2 Reps. of Comms. of
the Ass'n of the Bar Concerned with Fed. Legislation No. 2, at 21, 27-30 (1963); N.Y. Times,
Aug. 10, 1964, at 36, col. 1 (statement of law school deans); cf. Proceedings of the House of
Delegates, 36 A.B.A.J. 948, 957 (1950); Supreme Court of the U.S.: Amendments of the
Constitution Are Proposed, 34 A.B.A.J. 1, 1 (1948) (both suggest constitutional amendments
enlarging the Court's jurisdiction by limiting the powers of Congress).
103. See Briscoe v. Bell, 97 S. Ct. 2428, 2434 (1977).
104. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 5.
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aimed at maintaining state sovereignty. In United States v. Cruik-
shank, 0 -5 a case involving the right of black citizens to vote, the Court
held that this amendment merely gave Congress the power to enforce
rights which should be enforced by state governments. 0 6
In 1879 the Court stated that "[t]he prohibitions of the Fourteenth
Amendment are directed to the States, and they are to a degree
restrictions of State power. 10 7 Thus, Congress was given merely a
remedial power to counteract state laws which in some way had
interfered with individual rights. 108 As the Court subsequently stated,
"The Fourteenth Amendment. . . did not invest. . . Congress with
power to legislate upon subjects which are within the domain of state
legislation."' 0 9 Under this interpretation, the Court would first look to
the applicable state law to determine the rights which were involved,
and only secondarily to the Congress as the guarantor of such rights.
In practice, this role gave Congress very little room to effect any
remedial legislation. It fostered a situation in which Congress could
only act upon a right recognized by the state, but subsequently
removed. Under this interpretation, the Court often did not find, as
Congress had, that the state had in fact abridged a right."I0 This very
limited view of congressional power under section 5 of the fourteenth
amendment continued up until 1966 when the Court decided Katzen-
bach v. Morgan."'
105. 92 U.S. 542 (1876).
106. "That duty [equal protection of the laws] was originally assumed by the States; and it
still remains there. The only obligation resting upon the United States is to see that the States do
not deny the right. This the amendment guarantees, but no more. The power of the national
government is limited to the enforcement of this guaranty." Id. at 555; see Orloski, The
Enforcement Clauses of the Civil War Amendments: A Repository of Legislative Power, 49 St.
Johns L. Rev. 493 (1974).
107. Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 346 (1880). The Court went on to state, "It is these
[prohibitions against the states] which Congress is empowered to enforce, and to enforce against
State action . . . ." Id.
108. See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883). This view finds some support in the
legislative history of the amendment. Originally, the Joint Committee on Reconstruction reported
a bill which would have given Congress vast discretionary powers to enforce the section 1
guarantees. This version never obtained the necessary two-thirds majority and the present
compromise version of the amendment was substituted and enacted. See J. James, The Framing
of the Fourteenth Amendment 50, 82-83 (1956); Bickel, The Original Understanding and the
Segregation Decision, 69 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 57-60 (1955); Note, Federal Power To Regulate
Private Discrimination: The Revival of the Enforcement Clauses of the Reconstruction Era
Amendments, 74 Colum. L. Rev. 449 (1974).
109. In re Rahrer, 140 U.S. 545, 554-55 (1891).
110. See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883); United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629
(1883); Rotunda, Congressional Power To Restrict the Jurisdiction of the Lower Federal Courts
and the Problem of School Busing, 64 Geo. L.J. 839 (1976).
111. 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
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B. Congressional Power as Construed in
Katzenbach v. Morgan
In Morgan, the Court upheld section 4(e) of the Voting Rights Act of
1965 on fourteenth amendment grounds.1I 2 This Act provided that no
person receiving a sixth-grade education in an American-flag school
would be denied the right to vote on the ground that he was not
literate in English. 113 The principal effect of this provision was to
enfranchise Puerto Rican residents of New York formerly barred from
voting by the state's English literacy requirement. 114 The provision
was sustained, although literacy tests had been held not to be uncon-
stitutional per se; 115 and notwithstanding the fact that Congress had
made no attempt to justify the law on the ground that states such as
New York were using English literacy requirements as a subterfuge for
ethnic origin discrimination. 116
In deciding the case, the Court characterized section 5 as a broad
grant of discretionary power to Congress. Justice Brennan, writing for
himself and five other Justices, analogized this grant to the authority
arising under the necessary and proper clause. 117 He stated that
Congress could determine "whether and what legislation is needed to
secure the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment." 118 As long as
the Court could perceive a rational basis for the congressional determi-
nation that the measure was appropriate to insure the amendment's
guarantees, it would not inquire further.' 19
The Court also recognized Congress' independent authority to find
that state practices violated the equal protection clause, even where
the Court was unwilling to make that determination itself. As long as
Congress had a rational basis for its judgment, the Court would not
strictly scrutinize its actions. 120 Nevertheless, the Court placed an
important limitation upon the enforcement of any guarantees under the
amendment. In replying to a suggestion in the dissent that Congress
has the power under section 5 to define the substantive scope of the
fourteenth amendment, Justice Brennan emphasized:
112. Id. at 658.
113. Id. at 643.
114. Id. at 652-53.
115. Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45 (1959).
116. In a companion case to Morgan, the Court avoided the question of whether the New
York law was invalidated by the equal protection clause. Cardona v. Power, 384 U.S. 672 (1966).
117. 384 U.S. at 650.
118. Id. at 651.
119. Id. at 653.
120. "Here again, it is enough that we perceive a basis upon which Congress might predicate
a judgment that the application of New York's English literacy requirement ... constitutc[s] an
invidious discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection Clause." Id. at 656.
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Congress' power under § 5 is limited to adopting measures to enforce the guarantees of
the Amendment; § 5 grants Congress no power to restrict, abrogate, or dilute these
guarantees. Thus, for example, an enactment authorizing the States to establish
racially segregated systems of education would not be-as required by § 5-a measure
"to enforce" the Equal Protection Clause since that clause of its own force prohibits
such state laws. 121
According to Professor Cox of Harvard Law School, Morgan
showed the existence of a "vast untapped reservoir of federal legisla-
tive power to define and promote the constitutional rights of individ-
uals in relation to state government.,,1 22 This, he maintained, would
permit Congress to adopt a "comprehensive code of criminal proce-
dure" based on its "own findings of fact and evaluation of the compet-
ing considerations." ' 123
C. Congressional Power as Construed in
Oregon v. Mitchell
The Supreme Court cast doubt on the breadth of the Morgan
decision, however, in Oregon v. Mitchell. 24 This case involved the
Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1970.125 Without benefit of a
majority opinion and in five separate opinions the Court decided four
constitutional questions that defined Congress' power with regard to
standards for voting. The Court, per Justice Black, found: (1) that the
provision lowering the minimum voting age from twenty-one to eigh-
teen was valid as applied to federal elections;' 2 6 (2) that the provision
lowering the minimum voting age from twenty-one to eighteen was
invalid as applied to state elections, inasmuch as section 5 of the
fourteenth amendment did not authorize Congress to legislate qual-
ifications for state elections; 2 7 (3) that the suspension of literacy tests
for five years for federal, state, and local elections was a valid exercise
of congressional power under section 5 of the fourteenth amendment
and section 2 of the fifteenth amendment, since Congress based its
determination on a finding of fact that literacy tests were used to
121. Id. at 651 n.10.
122. Cox, The Supreme Court 1965 Term, Foreworck Constitutional Adjudication and the
Promotion of Human Rights, 80 Harv. L. Rev. 91, 99 (1966).
123. Id. at 108. See also Note, The Enabling Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment: A
Reservoir of Congressional Power?, 33 Colum. L. Rev. 854, 862 (1933) C'Congress appears to be
able to define equal protection and due process in positive terms, and thus exclude implicitly or
expressly an otherwise acceptable alternative.").
124. 400 U.S. 112 (1970).
125. Pub. L. No. 91-285 § 1, 84 Stat. 314 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973b, 1973c, 1973aa,
1973aa-1 to 1973aa-4 (1970 & Supp. V 1975)).
126. 400 U.S. at 117-18.
127. Id. at 118.
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deprive blacks of the franchise; 12 8 and (4) that federal legislation
governing registration and absentee voting in presidential elections was
constitutional. 12 9 In reaching these results, the Court departed from
the precedent of Morgan and recognized new requirements under the
Constitution for congressional action under the enforcement clause.
The Court divided three ways in Oregon. Morgan seemed to suggest
that the Court would give conclusive effect to a congressional determi-
nation, founded on some ascertainable basis, that the extension of the
vote to eighteen-year-olds was necessary to effectuate fourteenth
amendment protections. Alternatively, it might find that such age
discrimination constituted an invidious classification unsupported by a
compelling state interest. Four Justices, however, argued that Congress
lacked power to change age qualifications for all elections, 130 while
four others held the opposite. 13 1 The deciding vote was cast on
non-fourteenth amendment grounds by Justice Black, who decided
that although Congress had power to regulate federal elections under
article I, section 4, and the necessary and proper clause, the power to
determine qualifications for state elections was expressly delegated to
the states under article I, section 2.132
Justice Black stated that the historical context of all the Civil War
amendments was of overriding importance, and that the enforcement
clauses were chiefly intended to give Congress power to legislate against
racial discrimination.133 Given the lack of racial discrimination as an
issue in the case, Justice Black was firmly opposed to any enlargement
of congressional powers through the enforcement clause. 134 Justice
Harlan, who reached the same result on this point as Justice Black,
128. Id. at 118.
129. Id. at 119.
130. Id. at 154 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), 294 (Stewart, Burger &
Blackmun, J.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
131. Id. at 135 (Douglas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), 240 (Brennan, White
& Marshall, J.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
132. Id. at 117-30 (Black, J., announcing the judgments of the Court in an opinion expressing
his own views).
133. Id. at 127. "The Fourteenth Amendment was, surely not intended to make every
discrimination between groups of people a constitutional denial of equal protection. Nor was the
Enforcement Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment intended to permit Congress to prohibit every
discrimination between groups of people. On the other hand, the Civil War Amendments were
unquestionably designed to condemn and forbid every distinction, however trifling, on account of
race." Id.
134. As Justice Black recognized in his opinion, however, numerous decisions have held that
racial discrimination is not the only conduct which can violate the due process and equal
protection clauses. Id. at 126-27. In fact, it is through the fourteenth amendment that provisions
of the Bill of Rights have been made applicable to the states. Id. at 129.
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stated that the issue of equal protection was a judicial one, and
emphasized that the judiciary is "supreme in the exposition of the law
of the Constitution."1 3S
The limitation illustrated by Oregon v. Mitchell on congressional
power to reinterpret the meaning of due process and equal protection
had been foreseen by two authors in 1933, who stated:
There would be no doubt but that Congress could codify the rules in the field of due
process and equal protection already mapped out by the Supreme Court; and in so
doing, and in novel situations, probably could define fresh paths. However, Con-
gressional action might well arouse the jealousy of the courts .... [I]t would be rare
... that a Congressional definition would be held constitutional which contradicted a
previous position taken by the Court.
13 6
The result of Oregon and Morgan taken together may be that while
Congress can effectuate the policies of the due process and equal
protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment, ultimately the Court
will interpret the meaning of these guarantees. Nevertheless, the Court
has recognized that these clauses have expanded the powers of Con-
gress. 137 In addition, there is considerable historical support for the
expansive use of congressional power under section 5.138
The distinction between "rights" and the methods used to implement
them obviously cannot be stretched so far that Congress could so
exercise its enforcement power as to obliterate the rights. Perhaps
concern that such attempts will be made makes federal courts hostile
to efforts to limit their jurisdiction on constitutional matters. Such
efforts are probably consigned to a dim future.
135. Id. at 204 n.86 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Cooper v.
Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958)); see id. at 204-05 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803)); note 82 supra and
accompanying text.
136. Note, The Enabling Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment: A Reservoir of Congressional
Power?, 33 Colum. L. Rev. 854, 862 (1933) (footnotes omitted).
137. See, e.g., Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 345 (1880) ("It is the power of Congress which
has been enlarged."). But see note 103 supra and accompanying text. See also South Carolina v.
Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966) (discussing congressional power under the fifteenth amend-
ment).
138. See The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 91-101 (1873) (Field, J.,
dissenting); id. at 112-23 (Bradley, J., dissenting); In Memoriam, 126 U.S. app. 585, 600-01
(1888) (remarks of Samuel Shellabarger); H. Flack, The Adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment
136-39 (1908); Bickel, The Original Understanding and the Segregation Decision, 69 Harv. L.
Rev. 1, 27 n.54 (1955); Cox, The Role of€Congress in Constitutional Determinations, 40 U. Cin. L.
Rev. 199, 226-29 (1971); Frantz, Congressional Power To Enforce the Fourteenth Amendment
Against Private Acts, 73 Yale L.J. 1353, 1356 (1964); Grant, The Natural Law Background of Due
Process, 31 Colum. L. Rev. 56, 65-71 (1931); Note, The Enabling Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment: A Reservoir of Congressional Power?, 33 Colum. L. Rev. 854, 854-63 (1933).
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IV. AN ALTERNATIVE: CONGRESSIONAL PRESCRIPTIONS
To IMPLEMENT CONSTITUTIONAL RJGHTS IN THE AREA OF
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Many of the most important decisions on criminal procedure have
concerned the formulation by the courts of safeguards for constitu-
tional rights, based on the absence of other effective safeguards. Such
formulation offers a more promising area for possible congressional
action than attempts either to overrule judicial decisions by legislative
action under section 5 of the fourteenth amendment, or to make them
unenforceable by withdrawing jurisdiction under article III of the
Constitution.
A. The Exclusionary Rule
For example, decisions concerning the disposition of evidence ob-
tained in violation of the fourth amendment prohibition against unrea-
sonable searches and seizures represent a judicial choice of a particular
constitutional safeguard where no meaningful alternative seemed
available. In 1961, the Court in Mapp v. Ohio' 39 required the states to
observe the federal exclusionary rule because this appeared to be the
"only effectively available way" 140 to ensure compliance with the
fourth amendment and thus deter enforcement authorities from improp-
er conduct. 141
A number of additional means of enforcing the fourth amendment's
guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures have been pro-
posed, some to supplement the exclusionary rule and some to replace it
in whole or in part. 142 The majority of these proposals suggest that, as
an alternative to excluding the evidence obtained through an unlawful
search and thereby possibly allowing a criminal to go unpunished,
sanctions should be imposed upon the person or agency guilty of
conducting the illegal search. 14  Chief Justice Burger has suggested
that legislation permitting such sanctions include a waiver of sovereign
immunity for illegal acts committed by officers.' 44
139. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
140. Id. at 656 (quoting Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960)).
141. See Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 636-37 (1965).
142. See, e.g., Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 496-502 (1976) (Burger, C.J., concurring);
Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 422-23 (1971) (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting); 1969 Hearings, supra note 7, at 225-27; Search and Seizure Subcomm., Comm. on
Criminal Law, Federal Bar Ass'n of New York, New Jersey, and Connecticut, New Approaches
to Enforcement of the Fourth Amendment, 3 Crim. L. Bull, 630 (1967) [hereinafter cited as
Comm. on Criminal Law, New Approaches]; Comment, Reason and the Fourth Amendment-The
Burger Court and the Exclusionary Rule, 46 Fordham L. Rev. 139, 170-73 (1977).
143. See, e.g., Taft, Protecting the Public from Mapp. v. Ohio Without Amending the
Constitution, 50 A.B.A.J. 815, 817 (1964).
144. Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 422-23 (1971) (Burger,
C.J., dissenting).
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One possible sanction is civil damage suits. In connection with such
suits, it has been suggested that there be a minimum amount of
liquidated damages and that the equitable doctrine of unclean hands
not be available as a defense. 1 45 This would ensure that the individual
whose rights had been violated would be compensated regardless of
whether any incriminating evidence were found. The rights protected
by the fourth amendment would not be ignored simply because the
individual seeking their enforcement was suspected of a separate
crime. Because of the possible prejudice that might exist when a
suspected criminal brings a suit, it has also been suggested that these
suits be held before a quasi-judicial tribunal similar to the Court of
Claims. 14 6
An alternative to civil suit is that criminal sanctions be imposed
against offending officers where the violation is willful. These sanc-
tions currently exist, although in reality prosecutors rarely enforce
them. 147 To avoid this problem, it has been suggested that proceedings
could be initiated without a prosecutor, perhaps merely upon an
affidavit of the victim. Departmental action resulting possibly in fines
or suspension could then be taken against the offending officer if the
charges were upheld. 148 The risk here, however, of spite actions
against officers is severe-perhaps especially when they are doing their
duty.
Rather than make all evidence obtained through an unlawful search
inadmissible, it has been suggested that such evidence not be excluded
if the officer obtaining it was acting in good faith; that is, he did not
believe he was violating the individual's fourth amendment rights. 149
Such a proposal appears to be difficult to apply. The concept of good
faith is probably too vague to be used as a criterion for determining
whether there shall be any remedy when an individual's constitutional
rights have been violated. Another method for narrowing the scope of
the exclusionary rule would be to admit evidence obtained in violation
of the fourth amendment only if the crime is a serious one. The main
problem with this approach is that it might encourage law enforcement
officials to disregard entirely the mandate of the fourth amendment
where serious crimes were involved.150
Other methods proposed to enforce the fourth amendment's guaran-
145. Foote, Tort Remedies for Police Violations of Individual Rights, 39 Minn. L. Rev. 493,
514 (1955).
146. Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 423 (1971) (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting).
147. Foote, Tort Remedies for Police Violations of Individual Rights, 39 Minn. L. Rev. 493,
493-94 (1955); Plumb, Illegal Enforcement of the Law, 24 Cornell L.Q. 337, 388 (1939).
148. Plumb, Illegal Enforcement of the Law, 24 Cornell L.Q. 337, 388-89 (1939).
149. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 538 (1976) (White, J., dissenting).
150. Kaplan, The Limits of the Exclusionary Rule, 26 Stan. L. Rev. 1027, 1047 (1974).
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tee against unreasonable searches and seizures include: injunctive
relief,151 conditioning of a partial lifting of the exclusionary rule on an
adequate program to comply with the amendment,15 2 and new ad-
ministrative procedures. 15
3
If any of these remedies were adopted to supplement the exclusion-
ary rule or to replace it under certain circumstances, an important
consideration would be whether individual officers or the governmen-
tal agencies involved should be liable for any damages suffered.
Agency liability would guarantee a solvent defendant able to pay
damages and would avoid undue deterrence of individual officers who
might not be willing to act vigorously where a search was indicated for
fear of personal lawsuits against them. ' 54 In addition, the agency could
be expected to establish rules to minimize its liability by disciplining
officers whose actions resulted in agency liability. Administrative pen-
alties against officers who willfully offended might also be adopted. 55
Federal law could provide for federal agency liability. 15 6 Federal
action to impose liability on state and local governments, however,
might raise constitutional as well as public policy questions.15 7 Of
course, state and local agencies could be allowed to consent to liability
under federal law and offered some change in the exclusionary rule in
return, if that were deemed desirable, and if the totality of remedies
made available were found by the courts to be sufficiently effective.
B. Miranda Warnings
In Miranda v. Arizona, 15 8 the Court set forth requirements for the
admissibility into evidence of information given by criminal defendants
during custodial interrogation, again as a judicially prescribed safe-
guard in the absence of other effective safeguards. The Court stated:
151. Lankford v. Gelston, 364 F.2d 197 (4th Cir. 1966). But see Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S.
362 (1976).
152. 1969 Hearings, supra note 7, at 225-27; Comm. on Criminal Law, New Approaches,
supra note 142, at 631.
153. Burger, Who Will Watch the Watchman?, 14 Am. U.L. Rev. 1, 15-23 (1964); Davidow,
Criminal Procedure Ombudsman as a Substitute for the Exclusionary Rule: A Proposal, 4 Tex.
Tech. L. Rev. 317, 320 (1973); Horowitz, Excluding the Exclusionary Rule-Can There Be anl
Effective Alternative?, 47 L.A.B. Bull. 91, 97 (1972); Comment, Search and Seizure in Illinois:
Enforcement of the Constitutional Right of Privacy, 47 Nw. U.L. Rev. 493, 502-07 (1952).
154. See 1969 Hearings, supra note 7, at 226; Comm. on Criminal Law, New Approaches,
supra note 142, at 632; Foote, Tort Remedies for Police Violations of Individual Rights, 39 Minn.
L. Rev. 493, 514-15 (1955).
155. See note 153 supra.
156. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g) (Supp. V 1975); Gellhorn & Schenck, Tort Actions Against
the Federal Government, 47 Colum. L. Rev. 722 (1947).
157. See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
158. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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It is impossible for us to foresee the potential alternatives for protecting the privilege
which might be devised by Congress or the States in the exercise of their creative
rule-making capacities. Therefore we cannot say that the Constitution necessarily
requires adherence to any particular solution .... Our decision in no way creates a
constitutional straightjacket which will handicap sound efforts at reform . ... We
encourage Congress and the States to continue their laudable search for increasingly
effective ways of protecting the rights of the individual while promoting efficient
enforcement of our criminal laws.' s9
Hence, the Court in Miranda issued a broad invitation to legislative
development of new procedures for the interrogation of suspects. 160 To
date, the only legislative action that has been taken is Title H of the
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968,161 which
provided that a confession would be admissible in evidence if the
defendant gave it freely. Whether the defendant had been advised of
his rights was only one factor to be considered in determining the
voluntariness of the confession. 162
There have been other approaches suggested in this field, one being
that newly arrested suspects should be brought immediately to a
magistrate for interrogation, rather than to the police. This would
reduce the possibility of improper pressures resulting in confessions.
The accused's rights and privileges would be similar to the ones he
would have at trial. 163
It is generally assumed that the fifth amendment guarantee against
self-incrimination provides an absolute right to remain silent and
prohibits the drawing of adverse inferences under any circumstances.
However, some have suggested that extensive procedural safeguards
could be established, including absence of contempt or perjury sanc-
tions, absence of questions relating to internal mental operations or
religious or political beliefs, right to a transcript, and presence of
counsel, 164 which would make the drawing of an inference from
silence not "compulsion" in the constitutional sense. 16S Such questions
159. Id. at 467. See also Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976); Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed.
Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
160. 384 U.S. at 467.
161. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3501-3502 (1970).
162. Id. § 3501.
163. Note, Procedural Protections of the Criminal Defendant-A Reevaluation of the Privilege
Against Sef-Incrimination and the Rule Excluding Evidence of Propensity To Commit Crime, 78
Harv. L. Rev. 426, 445-49 (1964). See also 1969 Hearings, supra note 7, at 224.
164. Givens, Responding to Violence Through Order and Justice: Evolution of Rules Con-
cerning Interrogation, 13 N.Y.L.F. 780, 789-90 (1968).
165. See 1969 Hearings, supra note 7, at 222-24. Judge Friendly has proposed that a
procedure along these lines be adopted by constitutional amendment. Friendly, The Fifth
Amendment Tomorrow: The Case for Constitutional Change, 37 U. Cin. L. Rev. 671 (1968).
However, the cases decided to date do not deal with the type of procedural safeguards discussed
and do not clearly establish whether a constitutional amendment is necessary. See 1969 Hearings,
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could be evaluated on the basis of history 166 as well as "the steady
pressure of facts and events."'1 67
C. The Jencks Decision
Some congressional efforts to change criminal procedure in areas
touching on constitutional rights are limited in scope. An example of
this is the legislative activity following the Jencks decision. In Jencks
v. United States,168 the Court enlarged a criminal defendant's right of
access to government documents useful for cross-examination of prose-
cution witnesses. 169 Jencks was prosecuted for filing affidavits with the
NLRB falsely stating that he was not a Communist. 170 The Court
reversed the conviction because the trial court refused to allow the
defense access to relevant FBI reports. 17 1
There was a large public outcry against this decision, entirely out of
proportion to the limited import of its holding. 17 2 In response, Con-
gress felt obliged to pass contrary legislation. The statute that was
finally adopted established procedures whereby the defense could
obtain signed statements made and adopted by a witness, but only at
trial. 17 3 This procedure was substantially the same as that mandated
by the Jencks decision, so Congress did not, in fact, attempt to counter
the Supreme Court.
D. Evaluation
These are merely examples of some areas where further study could
lead to changes in procedure. The objective both from the constitu-
tional and practical standpoints should be to strengthen law enforce-
ment and individual rights simultaneously by updated procedures.
Indeed, the two are interdependent: Law enforcement cannot be fair if
supra note 7, at 222-24; Givens, Responding to Violence Through Order and Justice: Evolution of
Rules Concerning Interrogation, 13 N.Y.L.F. 780, 789-90 (1968).
166. See Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 58-77 (1964); J. Bentham, Rationale
of Judicial Evidence, 7 Works of Jeremy Bentham 458-63 (Bowring ed. 1843); E. Griswold, The
Fifth Amendment Today (1955); L. Levy, Origins of the Fifth Amendment (1968); 8 J. Wlgmore,
Evidence § 2250, at 267-95 (rev. ed. J. McNaughton 196)); Pittman, The Colonial and Constitu-
tional History of the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination in America, 21 Va. L. Rev. 763, 783-89
(1935).
167. H. Stone, Law and Its Administration 39 (1915).
168. 353 U.S. 657 (1957).
169. Id. at 669-72.
170. Jencks was prosecuted under 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1970).
171. 353 U.S. at 672.
172. The public was largely concerned with indiscriminate sifting of FBI files. See 103 Cong.
Rec. 10877-78 (1957); W. Murphy, Congress and the Court 129 (1962).
173. 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1970).
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it is not effective, and can hardly be truly effective if it is not fairly
administered.
Congress and the courts each have a role in the implementation of
constitutional rights. 17 4 In constitutional cases, however, the legisla-
tive safeguards must be what courts would consider effective if they
are to stand up as valid replacements of prior judicial protections. 17S
In determining what procedures should be considered, it is necessary,
of course, to look to the fundamental purpose of the constitutional
provision involved.'7 6 Underlying constitutional requirements may not
be compromised by legislatures.
The challenges of more effective criminal procedure, are, of course,
crucial on both the federal level and the state and local levels. The
limited but significant powers of Congress in the latter area should be
an additional encouragement to comprehensive reexamination of the
machinery of criminal justice generally.177
However, Congress must be very careful in selecting the areas of the
law of criminal procedure which should be codified and in defining the
constitutionally acceptable acts within that area. The advantage of
having principles established by case law has always been their
flexibility. Such flexibility is desirable because it permits subtle changes
to meet the needs of the individual case and the current social mores.
This is of particular importance in the area of constitutional law. If the
Court should stray too far in any direction in deciding a case or in the
language of its opinions, it can later alter its course. A striking example
of this change is the development of the law on the exclusionary rule in
the Warren and Burger Courts. 178
Statutes by their very nature have a greater permanence than case
law. It is more drastic for the Court to hold a statute unconstitutional
than it is for it to modify one of its earlier opinions. For this reason,
Congress must be very careful in deciding what procedures to man-
date.
174. See J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 433-35 (1964); Mitchell v. Robert De-fario
Jewelry, Inc., 361 U.S. 288, 290-93 (1960); Textile workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S.
448, 457 (1957); Deitrick v. Greaney, 309 U.S. 190, 200-01 (1940).
175. Cf. Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 57-61 (1965) (presumption against the constitu-
tional validity of prior restraints of expression).
176. See Broderick, Evolving Due Process and the French Institutionalists: Reflections on
the Right to Counsel and the Adamson Dissent, 13 Cath. U.L. Rev. 95, 110-16 (1964); cf. United
States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 2993 317-18 (1941) (for a determination as to whether constitutional
right to vote encompasses a right to vote in primary elections, the Constitution should be read in
its historical context to discover the intent of its framers). See generally Freund, New Vistas in
Constitutional Law, 112 U. Pa. L. Rev. 631, 636-39 (1964).
177. See House Select Comm. on Crime, Heroin and Heroin Paraphernalia, H.R. Rep. No.
1808, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 61-62 (1971).
178. See generally Comment, Reason and the Fourth Amendment-The Burger Court and the




Our system of separation of powers depends on a constructive
tension between those powers. Checks and balances should operate to
prevent any one branch from gaining too much control. Whereas the
President possesses the Executive power17 9 and is Commander in
Chief of the armed forces, 180 and Congress controls the appropriation
of federal funds, 18 1 the judicial branch has no substantial national
resources at its disposal. It must rely primarily upon recognition of its
authority for the enforcement of its decisions. 182 Yet it is this branch
which has been responsible to define the extent of its own and the
other'branches' functions. Through the institution of judicial review it
has interpreted the Constitution by which the powers of government
are defined.
The Supreme Court was intentionally isolated from the temporary
impact of popular will to prevent the exercise of any "tyranny of the
majority."'1 8 3 However, at times short-term majorities on particular
issues may become restive with what they perceive as the tyranny of
the Court, and seek a way to negate its decisions. This is particularly
true in the definition of constitutional rights. The courts have, to date,
developed most of the law regarding procedures to enforce federal
constitutional requirements in both state and federal criminal cases.
Congressional attempts to change the results of these decisions or to
alter their future course by regulation of the jurisdiction of the federal
courts under article III will necessarily encounter severe difficulties.
Efforts to alter judicial constructions of due process and equal protec-
tion guarantees by means of legislation under section 5 of the four-
teenth amendment would seem an equally unpromising approach. On
the other hand, under section 5 Congress would appear to have broad
power to deal with state procedures for the enforcement of fourteenth
amendment guarantees. In federal prosecutions, Congress has broad
discretion as to constitutional safeguards. The limitation in both
instances would be that the methods adopted by Congress to protect
constitutional rights must be those which courts would find effective.
Though actions of this nature which Congress could take have been
discussed, very little has been done. However, in this way Congress
could work with the Court, rather than against it, in those instances
where reliance on the continuing development of case law is deemed
inadequate. This leaves a wide area for potential legislative activity.
179. U.S. Const. art. II, § 1, cl. 1.
180. Id. § 2, cl. 1.
181. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
182. The Federalist No. 78 (A. Hamilton) 428 (Colonial Press ed. 1901).
183. J. Acton, Sir Erskine May's Democracy in Europe, in The History of Freedom and
Other Essays 97 (1907).
